The World Gas Model: A Multi-Period Mixed Complementarity Model for the Global Natural Gas Market

We provide the description and illustrative results of the World Gas Model, a multi-period complementarity model for the global natural gas market. Market players include producers, traders, pipeline and storage operators, LNG liquefiers and regasifiers as well as marketers. The model data set contains more than 80 countries and regions and covers 98% of world wide natural gas production and consumption. We also include a detailed representation of cross-border natural gas pipelines and constraints imposed by long-term contracts in the LNG market. The Base Case results of our numerical simulations show that the rush for LNG observed in the past years will not be sustained throughout 2030 and that Europe will continue to rely on pipeline gas for a large share of its imports and consumption.

A Complementarity Model for the European Natural Gas Market

In this paper, we present a detailed and comprehensive complementarity model for computing market equilibrium values in the European natural gas system. Market players include producers and their marketing arms which we call "transmitters", pipeline and storage operators, marketers, LNG liquefiers, regasifiers, tankers, and three end-use consumption sectors. The economic behavior of producers, transmitters, pipeline and storage operators, liquefiers and regasifiers is modeled via optimization problems whose Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions in combination with market-clearing conditions form the complementarity system. The LNG tankers, marketers and consumption sectors are modeled implicitly via appropriate cost functions, aggregate demand curves, and ex-post calculations, respectively. The model is run on several case studies that highlight its capabilities, including a simulation of a disruption of Russian supplies via Ukraine.European natural gas market, global LNG market, mixed complementarity problem

Representing GASPEC with the World Gas Model

This paper presents results of simulating a more collusive behavior of a group of natural gas producing and exporting countries, sometimes called GASPEC. We use the World Gas Model, a dynamic, strategic representation of world gas production, trade, and consumption between 2005 and 2030. In particular, we simulate a closer cooperation of the GASPEC countries when exporting pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas; we also run a more drastic scenario where GASPEC countries deliberately withhold production. The results shows that compared to a Base Case, a gas cartel would reduce total supplied quantities and induce price increases in gas importing countries up to 22%. There is evidence that the natural gas markets in Europe and North America would be affected more than other parts of the world. Lastly, the vulnerability of gas importers worldwide on gas exporting countries supplies is further illustrated by the results of a sensitivity case in which price levels are up to 87% higher in Europe and North America, but non-GEC countries increase production by a mere 10%.natural gas, trade, cartel, collusion, World Gas Model

The World Gas Market in 2030: Development Scenarios Using the World Gas Model

In this paper, we discuss potential developments of the world natural gas industry at the horizon of 2030. We use the World Gas Model (WGM), a dynamic, strategic representation of world natural gas production, trade, and consumption between 2005 and 2030. We specify a "base case" which defines the business-as-usual assumptions based on forecasts of the world energy markets. We then analyze the sensitivity of the world natural gas system with scenarios: i) the emergence of large volumes of unconventional North American natural gas reserves, such as shale gas; ii) on the contrary, tightly constrained reserves of conventional natural gas reserves in the world; and iii) the impact of CO2-constraints and the emergence of a competing environmental friendly "backstop technology". Regional scenarios that have a global impact are: iv) the full halt of Russian and Caspian natural gas exports to Western Europe; v) sharply constrained production and export activities in the Arab Gulf; vi) heavily increasing demand for natural gas in China and India; and finally vii) constraints on liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure development on the US Pacific Coast. Our results show considerable changes in production, consumption, traded volumes, and prices between the scenarios. Investments in pipelines, LNG terminals and storage are also affected. However, overall the world natural gas industry is resilient to local disturbances and can compensate local supply disruptions with natural gas from other sources. Long-term supply security does not seem to be at risk.Natural gas, investments, reserves, climate policy

A Prescriptive Trilevel Equilibrium Model for Optimal Emissions Pricing and Sustainable Energy Systems Development

We explore the class of trilevel equilibrium problems with a focus on energy-environmental applications. In particular, we apply this trilevel framework to a power market model, exploring the possibilities of an international policymaker in reducing emissions of the system. We present two alternative solution methods for such problems and a comparison of the resulting model sizes. The first method is based on a reformulation of the bottom-level solution set, and the second one uses strong duality. The first approach results in optimality conditions that are both necessary and sufficient, while the second one results in a model with fewer constraints but only sufficient optimality conditions. Using the proposed methods, we are able to obtain globally optimal solutions for a realistic five-node case study representing the Nordic countries and assess the impact of a carbon tax on the electricity production portfolio.Comment: 21 pages, 5 figure

Optimal transmission expansion planning in the context of renewable energy integration policies

This paper assesses the extent to which a renewables-driven expansion of the transmission system infrastructure impacts the total generation mix in the decentralised energy market. For that, we employ an optimisation bi-level model in which a welfare-maximizing transmission system operator makes investments in transmission lines at the upper level while considering power market dynamics at the lower level. To account for the deregulated energy market structure, we assume that the generation companies at the lower level make capacity investments as price-takers in perfect competition. Considering alternative transmission infrastructure expansion budgets, carbon emission taxes and monetary incentives for renewable generation capacity expansion, we study how alternative compositions of these factors affect the share of renewable generation in the generation mix. We apply the proposed modelling assessment to an illustrative three-node instance and a case study considering a simplified representation of the energy system of the Nordic and Baltic countries. Our results suggest the limited efficiency of the three measures when applied individually. Nevertheless, when applied together, these three measures demonstrated a positive impact on Nordics' and Baltics' energy system welfare, renewable share, and total generation. However, the amplitude of this impact differs depending on the composition of values used for the three measures.Comment: 31 pages, 20 Figures, 12 Table